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ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact of certain measures designed to
enhance employee ownership within the framework of the Portuguese privatisation
process.
We seek to quantify the advantages consented to employees considering the
package of special conditions they were entitled to, using data from 60 privatisation
operations. Initially employees benefited from significant financial advantages.
However, if they sold their shares just after the unavailability period, the returns
obtained were very uneven, if not negative. Were the special conditions offered to
employees simply the price paid for an environment of low social conflict?
Keywords: potential gains, effective gains, risk, return rate, adhesion rate.
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1. Introduction
At the beginning of the 80’s, the world witnessed an upturn in the tendency concerning the
State intervention in the economy. Since then a generalised movement towards privatisation
has taken place in different realities and in countries with distinct political ideologies (e.g.
Wright, 1993; Yarrow & Vickers, 1988; Parker, 1998). This movement also reached Portugal,
one of the countries with major privatisation programmes (e.g. Martins, 1997; GAFEEP, 1995).
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact of certain measures designed to enhance
employee ownership within the framework of the privatisation process. The structure of the
paper is as follows. In section 2 we make an overview of the legal framework of the Portuguese
privatisation program. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical strategy used. Then, in
section 4 the empirical findings are presented and discussed. Finally some concluding
comments are made in section 5.
2 - The privatisation process in Portugal
In the sequence of the 1974 revolution, 244 firms from important sectors of the economy were
nationalised. This fact corresponded to a considerable number of nationalisation operations
given the participation in other firms by the ones that were directly nationalised. Furthermore,
in 1977 a law (46/77) restricted the access of private entrepreneurs to certain sectors (insurance,
banking, chemicals, shipbuilding, cements, brewing, and tobacco). This law was partially
revoked in 1983 (decree law nº 406/83) and as a result of its latest version (1997), few sectors
still remain monopoly of the State, namely postal services, railways and ports.
The privatisation process began in 1988 when a law was passed approving a partial
(re)privatisation of state owned firms (up to 49% of their capital). Only after the Constitutional
changes in 1989 was the privatisation process in all its extent made possible. The privatisation
bill 11/90 made way for an ambitious privatisation program (more than 100 firms were
privatised by the end of 1999). Still, the delimitation sectors law restricted the operations to the
sectors already open to private economic initiative.
One of the privatisation objectives was "to allow a wide participation of Portuguese citizens in
the ownership of privatised firms, through an adequate dispersion of capital, giving particular
attention to the employees of the privatised firms and small subscribers". In order to attain this
objective, part of the shares privatised were reserved for small subscribers and specifically for
employees, who also benefited from lower prices than other small subscribers. Also, some of
the privatised firms included, in their remuneration policy, the granting of shares to their
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employees. Moreover, they also had special terms of payment not available to other small
subscribers namely delayed payment without interest, payment by instalment and cash
discounts. In some cases, loans were granted in order to encourage employee share ownership.
Finally, tax concessions were afforded to employee owners (higher amount of abatements to
income tax).
However, if these benefits were designed to enhance employee ownership, their conversion into
immediate profits had to be limited. A period of time was defined (two years in the law nº
84/88 of 1998, defined for each case after the privatisation bill of 1990) where employees were
forced to keep their shares (the unavailability period). Also since 1990, within this period,
employees could not delegate their voting rights. Another restriction was placed on the number
of shares that each employee could buy, a limit defined for each different operation. Later on
the decree law 243/91 gave employees the right to form investment funds with the shares
bought. This permitted employees to overcome some of the constraints that small owners faced
like limits to information access and real influence on the firm's General Assembly. Moreover
this fund could also contain assets from other companies.
Having defined employee ownership as one of the privatisation objectives, together with some
measures to enforce it, what has been the employee ownership record of this privatisation
programme? If some of the other objectives were clearly achieved, namely a reduction in State
weight in the economy 1 or a contribution to the development of the stock exchange market
(Barreiros & Oliveira, 1997), what can be said about employee ownership? Correia (1996)
studied employee ownership in privatised Portuguese firms and concluded that employees did
not show much enthusiasm for becoming owners of their firms.
However, after 1996, all the shares reserved for employees were bought, and in some cases
employee demand even surpassed supply 2. In spite of the existent incentives, and despite the
enthusiasm shown by employees, we believe that the employee ownership objective was settled
mainly to suppress potential opposition from employees and unions to privatisation. The
special conditions offered to enhance employee ownership and the implicit gains offered to
employees may have been simply the price of a low social conflict environment. If we consider
the possibility, confirmed in some cases, that the restructuring of the recently privatised firms
could be accompanied by downsizing, this idea gains increased consistency.
3 - Empirical strategy and data
As a first step we will address the question of how important the gains consented to employees
were considering only three aspects of the exclusive conditions they could access: price
reduction, cash discounts and tax benefits. Then, the gains obtained if they sold the shares in
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the stock market just after the unavailability period are evaluated and compared with the gains
resulting from a riskless security: time deposits. Finally the employee's rate of adhesion to
ownership is related to the benefits they were offered and also to some financial risk measures
of the privatised firms.
The data set was constructed with the available stock price information (Lisbon Stock Market
publications and online services) together with the legal diplomas related to each of the
privatisation operation (see annex 1). We also used some macroeconomic data regarding
employees’ average compensation (earnings plus benefits) taken from DE (from 1989 to 1995)
and DETEFP (from 1996 to 1998), and savings rates from Banco de Portugal reports (from
1989 to 1998).
The period studied goes from 1989 to the end of 1999 and we considered 60 privatisation
operations carried out through public offer. These 60 public offers correspond to only 43
different firms given that 12 of them were privatised in more than one operation (for instance
Portuguese Telecom was privatised in four different operations). Some of the privatised firms
were not quoted on the stock market and so the number of operations decreases when stock
price becomes part of the analysis (see annex 2 for a resume of the data on the special
conditions for each privatisation operation considered).
The privatisation strategy began with firms that had an uncontested market value in order to
attract private investors, and also to assure significant revenues for the State and to attract
investors’ attention for future operations. Chart 1 shows the relative importance of financial
sector operations' over the years in State revenues obtained each year 3. The number of
privatisation operations that took place each year appears at the top of the column for that year.
Chart 1 - Total privatisation revenues and financial firms privatisation revenues
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As mentioned above, certain sectors were still restricted to State intervention, and thus the
greater importance of the financial sector in the first year's operations can also be explained by
this fact.
4 - Empirical findings
4.1. A clear invitation to ownership
The first aspect we evaluate is the level of benefits available for employees at the moment of
the privatisation. The benefits we quantify are special conditions afforded to employees relative
to other small subscribers that already had some advantage in relation to institutional investors.
As referred to above, we only quantify three of the special conditions: price discounts, cash
discounts and tax benefits. Chart 2 presents the values of price and cash discounts in the
privatisation operations.
Chart 2 – Price and cash discounts
The chart shows that cash discounts when they existed, (they were not available in ten of the
sixty operations considered), were 10% until 1997 and then were reduced first to 5% and then
to 3%. Price discount behaviour was much more erratic though, showing a clear tendency to
decrease and disappearing completely from 1997 on.
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This decrease in the importance of cash and price discounts goes together with the existence of
a guarantee for a certain amount of shares in the case of allotment. In fact, after June 1995 (1st
phase of "Portugal Telecom" privatisation) some ebullience took up the stock market (see
section 4.2) and employees were no exception to the growing interest in privatisation
operations. From this operation on, this guarantee was made in two thirds of the eighteen
operations carried out.
Tax benefits were also quantified as, since 1992, employees and other small subscribers
benefited from the possibility of a tax deduction when buying shares in the firm where they
worked. For the calculation of the tax benefit granted to employees, we used: the tax rate
applied to the first income interval (t), the maximum values that employees could deduct from
the income over which the tax was going to be applied (me), and the maximum values that
other small subscribers could deduct from the income over which the tax was going to be
applied (ms). The values of tax benefit to employees resulted from the following formula:
t*(me-ms).
These three advantages were summed in order to calculate what we defined as the potential
gains offered to employees.
However, some of the other special conditions could also have had a significant financial
impact.
One of these was delayed payment without interest that was not quantified given that it was an
alternative to cash discounts. In 90% of cases, the formula used was a one-year payment period,
50% of it in equal monthly payments and the other 50% with the last monthly payment.
Employees could also choose to have these payments automatically deducted from their salary.
Finally, from 1997, a bonus was given to employees who kept their shares for a certain period
of one share for each twenty-five detained for more than one year. This bonus was
accompanied by a reduction in the period of time where employees were obliged to keep their
shares (from 2 years in the first operations to three months in later ones).
Transaction costs and dividend policies were not accounted for in our analysis due to the
difficulties in obtaining data. Nevertheless, we believe that our results are not significantly
affected given the low importance of transaction costs and the lack of a regular profit
distribution policy in the Portuguese stock market.
Sixty privatisation operations were considered and the advantages offered by each one were
quantified, the results being expressed in terms of minimum wages (monthly terms). By
referring these gains to the minimum wage, we intend to give a clearer idea of the relative
importance of these gains. 4. Chart 3 shows the maximum gains allowed in each operation, if
the employee had bought the maximum shares he was entitled to (potential gains).
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Chart 3 - Potential gains offered to employees
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The gains offered in each operation differ widely from an average of 2,3 times the minimum
wage, with a wide variation between 6 times more and 0,2 of the minimum wage 5. Among the
operations offering the lowest gains we find the ones regarding transport companies, some of
them resulting from the division of the national transport company (RN), although the lowest
value corresponds to the 2nd privatisation operation of a bank (BPA). To the other extreme,
among the ones offering the highest potential gains we find banks, insurance companies,
utilities and cement manufacturers, with the highest value regarding a bank (SFP - Banco
Mello).
Only in 38 of these operations there was the possibility of using the stock market to sell the
shares, thus we can wonder if this fact has influenced the gains offered to employees. The
evidence shows that on average, higher benefits were offered to employees in firms quoted on
the stock market this difference being statistically significant (Z score = 3,93) 6. This could be
related to some of the other objectives of the privatisation programme, namely the development
of the stock market. Also the higher risk for employee's investment due to stock market
fluctuations and the employees' general defiance in relation to its speculative attributes could
also have been taken into account in the form of higher potential gains offered to employees in
these firms.
Another way of stating the importance of these potential gains is to ask what would have been
the financial effort for employees in order to take advantage of these maximum benefits. Using
the average compensation of a Portuguese employee, we compare the necessary financial effort
to buy the amount of shares that will allow employees the maximum potential benefit with the
actual average savings rate in the economy for that year 7.
For the calculation of the necessary financial effort we used the number of shares reserved per
employee (n), the special price (p) and their compensation (c). The proxy used for employees’
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income was the average compensation (wages plus benefits) before taxes. The values result
from the following formula: (n*p / c). The observed savings rates were taken from the
Portuguese Central Bank reports and refer to disposable income. Results are shown in chart 4.
Chart 4 – Observed savings rate compared to necessary financial effort
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The chart clearly illustrates the significant employee's financial effort to take advantage of the
full benefits offered. Only in 28% of the observations is the necessary financial effort close to
the observed savings rate and in 20% of the observations the effort is higher than the average
yearly income. In these cases, in order to secure the benefits, several years’ savings would have
to be applied and employees' wealth concentration on their own firm's shares would be
inevitable. This would cause an inadequate concentration of risk from an investor's point of
view.
Nevertheless, this can also be seen as a clear sign of the magnitude of the potential gains
afforded to employees and thus of the importance of their adhesion to ownership within the
framework of the selected privatisation strategy.
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4.2. Immediate profits strategy: a good one?
The advantages offered to employees at the moment of privatisation could not be immediately
converted into real profits. The unavailability period, which was specific to each operation,
made the gains potential only. In the cases of the firms quoted (the ones with available data)
stock behaviour determined the effective returns of the employees’ decision to become owners.
Thus, employees’ immediate profits depend both on the special offer conditions and stock
market performance. Hence, apart from the specific risk attached to their firm, employees also
have their investments influenced by market risks. The evolution of the stock market index,
BVL geral, depicted in chart 5, clearly shows that different outcomes could have been obtained
in different periods of time.
Chart 5 - Lisbon stock market index evolution (BVL geral – January 1989 to
December 1999)
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Only considering the sale price, potential gains may turn into returns. These returns were then
compared to a riskless application (time deposit), in order to have a comparative indication of
the returns of such choice. This does not mean that we are not aware that employees could have
been influenced by other factors when they bought the shares, namely the idea of becoming
part of the decision making process or the desire of signalling their commitment to the firm's
new administration. We are only looking at the outcome of these decisions from an investment
point of view.
We took the operations related to firms with quoted stock and considered the stock price
variation between the privatisation moment and the end of the unavailability period (first
possible day of trading). The price at the moment of privatisation (offer price) already includes
the price and cash discounts. Comparing the offer price with the sale price allows the
calculation of a return rate that was subsequently annualised. Adding the corresponding tax
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benefit (which has an annual basis and occurs only at the end of the fiscal period), we were able
to calculate the return rate associated with all three special conditions taken into account.
Chart 6 shows these return rates for the firms quoted on the stock market. Each of the 33 points
corresponds to a privatisation operation. Two observations (relative to 1997) were excluded
from the chart. Their extremely high values will hide the information contained in the chart
from view.
Chart 6 – Privatised stock return rates– by year
The results do not show a clear-cut situation. The stock  market situation after 1995 allowed
significant positive rates, mainly in 1996 and 1997. One must also note that the two operations
excluded from the chart due to their extremely high values (Brisa 1st - 1224% and EDP 1st -
302%) are also from 1997. So, very high returns were possible for employees mainly in the
latter period that is, when the stock market ‘took off’. The first years' operations, in spite of
being associated with higher potential gains, allowed lower return rates, which were even
negative in some cases.
Next chart presents the interest rates from time deposits, the average rate of return for the
privatised stocks and also the average rate of returns of privatised stocks for each year.
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Chart 7 – Privatised stock and time deposit interest rates
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The chart shows the higher average return rate of the privatised stocks together with a different
pattern of behaviour when viewed on an average yearly basis.
Employees' gains seem to follow the stock market index variation pattern (see chart 4). The fact
that the correlation coefficient between returns and potential gains is negative (-0,203 and
statistically significant) suggests that returns were fundamentally influenced by stock prices.
4.3. Privatised firms, did employees know it was a good investment?
What was the employee's adhesion rate in each operation? Was this rate somehow related to the
potential gains offered? To what extent did employees anticipate the returns they could obtain,
that is to say, did they know what they were buying or did they just become owners due to the
generosity of the potential gains?
To address these issues we first took a measure of employees’ adhesion to ownership (number
of shares bought / number of shares reserved) and in the operations where the data was
available (number of shares wanted/ number of shares reserved), respectively EAR (effective
adhesion rate and PAR (potential adhesion rate). Chart 8 shows that the differences between the
two adhesion rates appears only after 1995 confirming the increased employee’s enthusiasm for
buying shares that clearly surpassed the amount reserved for them.
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Chart 8 –PAR - EAR
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The adhesion rate (PAR) was then regressed in the potential gains offered to employees at the
moment of privatisation. What we wanted to find out was whether potential gains were
important in employee decision making. Considering the fact that after June 1995 price
advantages were reduced and substituted by a guarantee of a certain amount of shares in the
case of allotment, we take this as a proxy of the enthusiasm for stock market in general and
privatisation operations in particular. In this situation, the State was able to guarantee the
adhesion of workers only by assuring them a certain quantity of shares. Thus we take it as a
sign of higher expected returns in this period and so of a possible different relation between
adhesion rate and potential gains due to a different stock market climate.
Regression results are presented below for 53 observations given that in seven cases (in five
cases for EAR), data was not available.
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Table 1 –Adhesion rates and potential gains - regression results
PAR PAR PAR PAR PAR PAR PAR PAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
constant 0,259 0,511 0,449 0,217 0,005 0,217 0,025 0,174
(0,73) (2,12) (1,22) (1,06) (0,01) (1,00) (0,05) (0,80)
PG 0,322 -0,022 -0,281 0,072 0,174 0,007 0,159 0,051
(2,49) -(0,23) -(0,12) (0,93) (1,22) (0,83) (0,27) (0,60)
QF 0,961 0,926 0,164
(2,16) (1,26) (0,59)
PG*QF 0,346 0,019
(1,72) (0,06)
AG 2,995 2,988 2,941
(10,34) (4,27) (9,63)
PG*AG 0,814 0,002
(8,02) (0,01)
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53
AR2 0,091 0,594 0,124 0,705 0,151 0,698 0,134 0,700
P
AR = potential adhesion rate; PG = potential gains offered in the privatisation moment; AG = dummy variable
with 1 = operations where there was a guarantee of a number of shares in case of allotment, 0 = otherwise; PG
* AG = interactive dummy; QF = dummy variable with 1 = quoted firms, 0 = non-quoted firms; PG * QF =
interactive dummy.
N = number of observations; AR2 = adjusted R2; t ratios in parentheses.
Equation [1] indicates the existence of a positive relation between employees' adhesion rate and
the potential gains offered. However the introduction in equation [2] of the interactive dummy
clearly shows that this positive association is due to the observations where there was an
allotment guarantee. Also, adhesion rates seem to have been differently influenced by potential
gains in quoted firms as shown by the significant coefficient of PG*QF in equation [3]. A
different behaviour of the adhesion rate is noted by the dummy variables QF and AG
(equations [5] and [6]), but the adhesion rate seems to have been mainly determined by the
existence of an allotment guarantee (equation [8]). Thus, we confirm the idea of a stock market
evolution as the main determinant of the adhesion rate.
What about the returns obtained after selling the shares at the end of the unavailability period?
To what extent were employees aware of the real value of what they were buying and how did
it affect their adhesion rates? If we consider the possibility that employees adhesion rate could
be explained by their knowledge of their own firm, then employees should avoid becoming
owners in firms with high specific risks. Thus, we expect the adhesion rate to be lower in these
cases (Moura Ramos, 1999). We calculate the Fsr (Firm specific risk) taking into account the
stock market variation of a stock and the extent to which its variation is not explained by stock
market variations. In order to calculate each firm specific risk we took the available monthly
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data for each firm (making the risk measures being calculated with different number of
observations) and regressed against stock market information for the same period.
Rit - variation [month(t) - month(t-1)] of the stock price of firm i;
Rmt - variation [month(t) - month(t-1)] of the market price index.
[ 1 ] Rit = η + δj Rmt + Eit ;
the residual [Eit] obtained from [1] is the variation of the firm stock price not explained by
market variations, that is the firm specific risk [Fsr]. This is defined as:
[ 2 ] Fsri = tE
t
ti /)(
2
1∑ .
With this risk measure calculated for each firm, we then tried to see to what extent it is related
with the employees' adhesion rate.
When we consider the return rate and firm specific risk measures, the number of observations
goes down because only for quoted firms it was possible to calculate both the return rates and
firm specific risks. Results are presented in table 2.
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Table 2 –Adhesion rates and return rates and firm specific risks - regression results
PAR PAR PAR PAR PAR PAR PAR PAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
constant 1,230 0,471 1,284 0,485 0,834 0,448 1,945 0,672
(4,16) (2,18) (4,19) (2,15) (2,28) (1,78) (4,61) (1,42)
RR 0,320 0,060 -0,579 -0,084
(2,47) (0,67) -(0,68) -(0,15)
RR*AG 0,911 0,148
(1,06) (0,26)
FSR 29,83 1,027 -106,0 -19,30
(2,96) (0,13) -(2,88) -(0,52)
FSR*AG 126,5 21,38
(3,79) (0,56)
AG 2,854 2,931 2,951 2,680
(6,95) (6,64) (6,12) (3,90)
N 33 33 33 33 31 31 31 31
AR2 0,137 0,658 0,141 0,648 0,205 0,648 0,456 0,639
PAR = potential adhesion rate; RR = return rates; AG = dummy variable with 1 = operations where there
was a guarantee of a number of shares in case of allotment, 0 = otherwise; RR * AG = interactive dummy;
FSR = firm specific risk; FSR * AG = interactive dummy.
N = number of observations; AR2 = adjusted R2; t ratios in parentheses.
The coefficients of both variables RR and FSR are only important to explain the adhesion rate
when the allotment guarantee dummy is not considered (regressions [1] and [5]). When this
variable is considered all the other variables loose their explanatory power, showing results that
stress, as shown in table 1, the clear influence of the stock market momentum on employee
ownership decision making.
5 - Concluding Comments
The privatisation process in Portugal defined as one of its aims the promotion of ownership
among small investors with a special concern for employees. This emphasis was turn into
benefits offered at the moment of privatisation. These benefits were on average equal to 2,3
times the minimum wage, and the savings effort needed to secure them was sometimes higher
than a yearly average income showing the relevant economic significance of the benefits
offered. Nevertheless these benefits were only potential ones because employees could not sell
their shares during the non-availability period. Employees' returns showed a mixed situation,
being sometimes negative and, in the period after 1995, being extraordinarily high. Between
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1996 and 1997 these rates were clearly higher than average and always higher than the interest
rate offered by time deposits. Employee ownership decisions seem to have been influenced
mainly by the general enthusiasm for privatisation that influenced all the investors, including
the small subscribers in which employees were included. The decision to buy shares in their
own firms allowed employees the possibility of making good investments when stock market
behaviour permitted it. In other cases the results associated with these investments were
actually negative, in spite of the significance of the potential benefits offered.
The mechanism designed to secure information access and influence a firm's General Assembly
(the constitution of investment funds that grouped employees' shares) was never used by
employees. The total share owned by employees was never very significant and the available
mechanism to transform it in a unique voice was never used. The employee ownership outcome
was thus deceptive from the standpoint of increased formal employee participation. Perhaps
employee ownership was just a tool for a successful transition from State (sometimes
monopolistic) logic to a private one. Market rules are always easy to accept if we can gain
something from them.
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Annex 1 - Privatization operations: legal diplomas
  
Name of the firm
Date of the
operation
Legal diplomas
  
Several firms Until 31/12/1995 See Correia (1996:231-239)
P. Telecom 2ª 1996 D.L 34 A/96; RCM 67 A/96; RCM 75 A/96
Cimpor 2ª 1996 D.L 64/96; RCM 163 A/96
BTA última 1996 D.L 261/96;D.L 200 A/96; RCM 182/96
Fábrica
Tab.Micaelense
1996
D.L 90/95; RCM 60/95; RCM 88/95
BCA 1996 RCM 59/95; RCM 77/95
BFE 3ª 1997 D.L 33/96; RCM 9 A/97
EDP 1ª 1997 D.L 78 A/97; RCM 68/97; RCM 82/97; RCM 95/97
SN - longos 2ª 1997 n.a.
P. Telecom 3ª 1997 D.L 226 A/97; RCM 149 A/97; RCM 167/97
Brisa 1ª 1997 D.L 253/97; RCM 191 A/97; RCM 198/97; RCM 200 A/97
Cimpor 3ª 1998 D.L 94 A/98; RCM 61/98; RCM 63/98
EDP 3ª 1998 D.L 94 C/98; RCM 65/98
Brisa 2ª 1998 D.L 299 A /98; RCM 125/98; RCM 131/98; RCM 134/98
P. Telecom 4ª 1999 D.L 119 A /99; RCM 56/99; RCM 70/99; RCM 81/99
Brisa 3ª 1999 D.L 138 A /99; RCM 39/99; RCM 45/99; RCM 81/99
n.a. : not available
RCM – Resolution Council Ministers
D.L. – Decree law
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Annex 2 - 60 Main Privatization Operations
Privatization Date (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) Price Cash Delay payment
Possibility of
payments
Number of
shares Bonus
operation
discounts discount (without interest)
to be
discounted in
the salary
guarantee (in
allotment)
(for keeping
shares)
Unicer 1ª 26.04.89 2 years 0.49 0,39 0.39 0.12 0.06 0.30 4.17 10.00
2 years, monthly,
trimester, or semester
payments
Yes
  
BTA 1ª 10.07.89 2 years 0.49 0,51 0.51 0.13 0.06 0.25 6.67 10.00
2 years, monthly
payments Yes   
Aliança Seguradora 1ª 02.10.89 2 years 0.49 0,50 0.50 0.15 0.07 0.30 3.45 10.00
2 years, monthly
payments Yes   
Tranquilidade 1ª 04.12.89 2 years 0.49 0,33 0.33 0.10 0.05 0.30 4.35 10.00
2 years, monthly
payments Yes   
J. Notícias 11.05.90 2 years 0.86 1,04 1.00 0.05 0.04 0.05 10.00 10.00
2 years, monthly
payments Yes   
Unicer 2ª 28.06.90 1 year 0.51 1,00 1.00 0.03 0.02 0.03 5.26
1 year, monthly
payments Yes   
BTA 2ª 31.07.90 1 year 0.31 0,49 0.49 0.10 0.03 0.20 3.57
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
Tranquilidade 2ª 09.10.90 1 year 0.51 0,11 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.20 2.86
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
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Privatization Date (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) Price Cash Delay payment
Possibility of
payments
Number of
shares Bonus
operation
discounts discount (without interest)
to be
discounted in
the salary
guarantee (in
allotment)
(for keeping
shares)
Centralcer 12.11.90 1 year 1.00 0,09 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.20 4.55 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
BPA 1ª 11.12.90 1 year 0.33 0,49 0.49 0.12 0.04 0.25 4.93
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
SFP 06.05.91 1 year 1.00 0,08 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.10 4.35 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
D. Notícias 15.05.91 2 years 1.00 0,01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 10.00
3 years, semester
payments
Yes
  
Aliança Seguradora 2ª 29.05.91 1 year 51.00 0,03 0.03 0.01 0.29 0.20 7.06
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
Bonança 1ª 25.06.91 1 year 60.00 0,52 0.52 0.17 10.49 0.33 6.43 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
BESCL 1ª 09.07.91 1 year 40.00 0,65 0.65 0.16 6.46 0.25
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50% Yes   
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Privatization Date (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) Price Cash Delay payment
Possibility of
payments
Number of
shares Bonus
operation
discounts discount (without interest)
to be
discounted in
the salary
guarantee (in
allotment)
(for keeping
shares)
6.06
- last monthly payment
BESCL 2ª 25.02.92 1 year 60.00 1,00 1.00 0.11 6.74 0.11 5.80
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
Rod. Algarve 10.03.92 1 year 100.00 0,03 0.03 0.01 0.65 0.19 5.45 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
Mundial Confiança 14.04.92 1 year 100.00 0,05 0.05 0.01 1.33 0.25 5.65
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
Rod. Douro e Minho 22.04.92 1 year 100.00 0,04 0.04 0.01 0.84 0.20 7.14 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
BPA 2ª 25.05.92 3 months 17.64 n.a. n.a. 0.03 0.45 n.a. 0.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
Transporta 12.05.92 1 year 100.00 0,02 0.02 0.00 0.42 0.20 5.08 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
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Privatization Date (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) Price Cash Delay payment
Possibility of
payments
Number of
shares Bonus
operation
discounts discount (without interest)
to be
discounted in
the salary
guarantee (in
allotment)
(for keeping
shares)
Rodocargo 19.05.92 1 year 100.00 0,01 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.20 6.45 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
BFB 2ª 20.07.92  20.00 0,02 0.02 0.02 0.48 1.00 4.76
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
Império 17.11.92 1 year 100.00 0,70 0.70 0.11 10.55 0.15 3.13 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
Cosec 25.11.92 1 year 3.33 0,75 0.75 0.75 2.50 1.00 4.76 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
CPP 02.12.92 1 year 100.00 0,26 0.26 0.05 5.13 0.20 3.70 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
Bonança 2ª 09.12.92 1 year 15.00 0,36 0.36 0.09 1.33 0.25 2.33 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
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Privatization Date (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) Price Cash Delay payment
Possibility of
payments
Number of
shares Bonus
operation
discounts discount (without interest)
to be
discounted in
the salary
guarantee (in
allotment)
(for keeping
shares)
UBP 1ª 03.02.93 1 year 61.11 0,50 0.50 0.07 4.56 0.15 8.00 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
Rádio Comercial 12.04.93 1 year 100.00 0,17 0.17 0.02 1.70 0.10
2.94 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
BPA 3ª 07.07.93 1 year 17.50 0,34 0.34 0.03 0.50 0.09 2.78 10.00  Yes   
Rod. B. Litoral 27.07.93 1 year 100.00 0,28 0.28 0.06 5.66 0.20 5.26 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
Rod. B. Interior 09.11.93 1 year 100.00 0,05 0.05 0.01 0.92 0.20 6.09 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
Rod. do Tejo 16.11.93 1 year 100.00 0,43 0.43 0.09 8.56 0.20 6.60 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
Rod. Alentejo 20.12.93 1 year 100.00 0,13 0.13 0.03 2.59 0.20 6.52 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
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Privatization Date (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) Price Cash Delay payment
Possibility of
payments
Number of
shares Bonus
operation
discounts discount (without interest)
to be
discounted in
the salary
guarantee (in
allotment)
(for keeping
shares)
Cimpor 1ª 04.07.94 3 months (*) 20.00 0,19 0.19 0.05 0.94 0.25 3.70 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
Rod. Estremadura 08.08.94 1 year 100.00 0,01 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.20 4.55 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
BFE 1ª 27.12.94 1 year 19.50 0,75 0.75 0.13 2.56 0.18 4.17 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
Rod. Sul do Tejo 10.01.95 1 year 100.00 n.a. 1.00 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.94 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
BPSM 2ª 28.12.95 1 year 20.00 0,55 0.55 n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.82 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
Rod. Lisboa 15.05.95 1 year 100.00 0,01 0.01 n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.41 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
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Privatization Date (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) Price Cash Delay payment
Possibility of
payments
Number of
shares Bonus
operation
discounts discount (without interest)
to be
discounted in
the salary
guarantee (in
allotment)
(for keeping
shares)
SECIL 2ª 29.05.95 1 year 7.94 0,19 0.19 n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.17 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
CMP 2ª 29.05.95 1 year 20.00 0,19 0.19 n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.46 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
P. Telecom 1ª 01.06.95 6 months 14.21 0,50 0.50 0.09 1.28 0.18 0.00 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment 85  
Portucel Industrial 1ª 27.06.95 6 months 32.20 1,24 1.05 0.26 8.47 0.25 0.00 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment   
SOCARMAR 2ª 09.08.95  n.a! n.a n.a 7.41 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment   
P. Telecom 2ª 11.06.96 6 months 6.66 1,72 1.00 0.32 2.12 0.32 0.00 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment 70  
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Privatization Date (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) Price Cash Delay payment
Possibility of
payments
Number of
shares Bonus
operation
discounts discount (without interest)
to be
discounted in
the salary
guarantee (in
allotment)
(for keeping
shares)
Cimpor 2ª 15.10.96 6 months 20.47 1,38 1.00 0.04 0.83 0.04 0.00 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
yes
200  
BTA 3ª 19.11.96 6 months 3.07  1.00 0.35 1.06 0.35 0.00 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment 100  
Fábrica Tab.Micaelense 05.12.96  10.00 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 11.76 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
BCA 09.12.96 1 year 10.00 0,89 0.89 0.87 8.72 0.98 13.04 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment   
BFE 3ª 07.02.97 3 months 3.24 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.00 5.00
2 years, 50% - 3 equal
semester  payments,
50% last semester
payment 200  
EDP 1ª 16.06.97 3 months 16.23 5,88 1.00 0.06 0.93 0.06 0.00 5.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment 300 25*1_1 year
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Privatization Date (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) Price Cash Delay payment
Possibility of
payments
Number of
shares Bonus
operation
discounts discount (without interest)
to be
discounted in
the salary
guarantee (in
allotment)
(for keeping
shares)
SN 2ª 04.08.97  0.59 n.a. n.a. 0.20 0.12 0.00 0.00 10.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
  
P. Telecom 3ª 09.10.97 3 months 9.03 4,44 1.00 0.18 1.63 0.18 0.00 3.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment 100 25*1_1 year
Brisa 1ª 24.11.97 3 months 19.45 3,85 1.00 0.04 0.71 0.04 0.00 3.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment 200 25*1_1 year
Cimpor 3ª 18.05.98 3 months 25.00 3,26 1.00 0.02 0.58 0.02 0.00 3.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment 200 25*1_1 year
EDP 3ª 26.06.98 3 months 25.00 5,17 1.00 0.06 1.54 0.06 0.00 3.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment 200 25*1_1 year
Brisa 2ª 09.11.98 3 months 15.50 3,76 1.00 0.02 0.31 0.02 0.00 3.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment 100 25*1_1 year
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Privatization Date (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) Price Cash Delay payment
Possibility of
payments
Number of
shares Bonus
operation
discounts discount (without interest)
to be
discounted in
the salary
guarantee (in
allotment)
(for keeping
shares)
P. Telecom 4ª 12.07.99 3 months 2,91 1.00 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.00 3.00   25*1_1 year
Brisa 3ª 24.05.99 3 months 20.00 5,02 1.00 0.03 0.68 0.03 0.00 3.00
1year, 50% - equal
monthly payments, 50%
- last monthly payment
Yes
100 25*1_1 year
(A): Unavailability period
(B): Share sold by the state(%)
(C): Shares demanded by employees / Shares Supplied to employees
(D): Shares effectively bought by employees / Shares reserved to employees
(E): Shares effectively bought by employees / Number of shares sold (total)
(F): % of capital property of employees
(G): Shares reserved to employees) / Number of shares sold (total)
Source: legislation, Lisbon Stock Market Publications and online services.
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NOTES
1 19,7% of GDP and 5,5% of total employment in 1988 against 8% of GDP and 2,6% of total
employment in 1999 (DGEP, 1999).
2 For instance in 1997 in the 1st phase of EDP (electricity) privatisation, employee’s demand
was 5,9 times higher than the amount reserved for them (see chart 8).
3 Note that 1 Euro = 200,482 PTE.
4 One should refer the decrease of the ratio (Minimum wage/ Average wage) from a value of
0,48 in 1989 to a value of 0,43 in 1998.
5 One should take into account that these potential gains are calculated irrespective to the time
period where they can be transformed in actual gains (unavailability period).
6 Z = 
12
2
11
1
21
22
−
+
−
−
N
S
N
S
XX
with: X = average value for  the sub-sample; S = standard- deviation for the sub - sample; N =
number of observations in the sub-sample; 1 = quoted firms; 2 = non-quoted firms.
7 Among the special conditions that made employees investment possible two were not
considered in our analysis: delayed payment without interest and loans. In the cases where they
were in effect, the calculated financial effort may not be the exact measure of the real effort
rate.
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